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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), § 63-46b-
16 (Supp. 1988), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Final Decision and Order of the Utah State Tax Commission 
(the "Commission"), dated June 28, 1991, which determined that 
improved building lots owned by appellees Benchmark, Inc. ("Bench-
mark") qualify for assessment using an absorption adjustment to 
allow for the time value of the investment in the property. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for consideration: 
1. Is it appropriate to use different valuation methodolo-
gies on comparable properties, which results in disparate treatment 
of comparable lots in the same subdivison? 
2. Does the granting of a bulk discount or the recognition 
of an absorption period, based upon the character of the owner of 
othe property and the number of lots owned, produce a result that 
is contrary to the provisions of the Utah Constitution and the Utah 
statutes that require equality and uniformity of assessment for ad 
valorem property tax purposes? 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-2-103(1): 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall 
be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided 
by law. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 59-2-102(3): 
As used in this chapter and title: 
* * * 
(3) "Fair market value" means the amount 
at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and 
both having reasonable knowledge of the rele-
vant f a c t s , . . . . " 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 2: 
(1) All tangible property in the State, 
not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in propor-
tion to its value, to be ascertained as pro-
vided by law. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money, and 
shall prescribe by law such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 
such property, so that every person and corpo-
ration shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible property. . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final decision and order of the 
Commission, dated June 28, 1991, after a formal hearing. The Salt 
Lake County Board of Equalization declined to recognize Benchmark's 
claim, seeking a discount from the comparable sales value placed on 
its improved and subdivided lots. Benchmark's claim, and the 
Commission's ultimate determination that an absorption adjustment 
is appropriate, rests on the character of the owner of the property 
and the number of parcels owned, not the value of the separate 
parcels of property. 
The County argued that the lots were developed and intended to 
be sold as individual building lots for exclusive, luxury homes and 
that the value of the properties should be determined on the basis 
of comparable sales of individual lots. The Commission found that 
lf[t]he value of a lot sold today at a given price is greater than 
the value of a lot sold years into the future for the same price." 
Based upon this finding, the Commission determined that, because 
Benchmark anticipated it would take eight years to fully sellout 
the project, the property should be assessed utilizing the absorp-
tion discount. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The tax years involved in this appeal are 1987, 1988, and 
1989. R. 8. 
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2. The properties that are the subject matter of this appeal 
are fully developed subdivision lots located in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, within a subdivision identified as "Benchmark Subdivision", 
owned by Benchmark, Inc. R. 49. 
3. Within the Benchmark Subdivision are lots that were sold 
by Benchmark to individual purchasers, some of which contain homes 
and others which are individually owned, but do not have homes 
built upon them. R. 9-10. 
4. During the years in question, the County Assessor valued 
each of the subdivision lots using the comparable sales methodology 
of valuation. R., Exhibit 6. 
5. The expert witnesses testifying before the Commission at 
the formal hearing substantially agreed upon the fair market value 
of the individual lots under the comparable sales approach to 
valuation. R. 009. 
6. Benchmark's expert witness testified that an additional 
discount should be given to the lots within the subdivision owned 
by Benchmark, Inc. during the years in question to reflect the 
period of time required for Benchmark to dispose of all of its 
lots. R. 10. 
7. The Commission, in an earlier case involving the 
identical subdivision and in two subsequent cases involving Upland 
Industries, determined that when a single taxpayer owns multiple 
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lots, an absorption or bulk discount is appropriate to reflect the 
period of time it will take to sell those lots within the applica-
ble marketplace. R. 11, 40-48. 
8. The Commission followed its previous rulings and issued 
its Final Decision and Order, directing the County to adjust the 
assessed value of the subject property to reflect the absorption or 
bulk discount. R. 8-20. 
9. The County seeks reversal of the Commission's Final 
Decision and Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant takes the position that uniform assessment of 
properties within Salt Lake County requires a determination of the 
fair market value of the property as of January 1 of each year; 
fair market value being the price a willing buyer will pay to a 
willing seller in a hypothetical sale. In arriving at that value, 
the County asserts that the number of lots owned by the taxpayer is 
irrelevant and that an absorption discount is inappropriate. To 
hold otherwise, would confer preferential treatment on developers 
and place an unfair share of the tax burden on individual lot 
owners. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION AND ORDER CONTRAVENES 
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY IN ASSESSMENT AND 
TAXATION MANDATED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
(1) All tangible property in the State, 
not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in propor-
tion to its value, to be ascertained as pro-
vided by law. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3, requires: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money, and 
shall prescribe by law such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 
such property, so that every person and corpo-
ration shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible property. . 
To implement this mandate, the legislature enacted Utah Code 
Annotated, §§ 59-2-103(1), which provides: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall 
be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate on the basis of its fair market value, as 
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided 
by law. [Emphasis added.] 
"Fair market value", as used in U.C.A. § 59-5-103, is defined 
at U.C.A. § 59-2-102(3): 
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(3) "Fair market value" means the amount 
at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and 
both having reasonable knowledge of the rele-
vant facts. . . . 
The constitution and legislative scheme of taxation and 
assessment requires the County Assessor to determine the "fair 
market value" of properties based upon the amount a willing buyer 
would pay a willing seller, in a hypothetical sale, on January 1 of 
each year. The constitutional and legislative provisions set 
parameters by which all tangible, taxable property shall be valued 
for ad valorem tax purposes within the State of Utah. The goal of 
this scheme is to assure, to the greatest extent possible, that all 
property shall be uniformly and equally assessed. As this Court 
explained in Cunningham v. Thomas. 16 Utah 86, 50 P. 615 (1897): 
It is evident that the term "according to its 
value in money" [Article XIII, § 3] means that 
all property shall be valued, for the purposes 
of assessment, as near as is reasonably prac-
ticable, at its full cash value; in other 
words, that the valuation for assessment and 
taxation shall be, as near as reasonably 
practicable, equal to the cash price for which 
the property valued would sell in the open 
market, for this is doubtless the correct test 
of the value of the property. 
50 P. 615, at 615-616. [Emphasis added.] 
This Court noted in Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P.2d 
876 (Utah 1969): 
It would appear that the term "its value 
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in money" as used in the foregoing provision 
[Article XIII, § 3] is synonymous with the 
term "reasonable fair cash value", "cash 
value", and "market value," as are generally 
used in referring to property values. 
While absolute equality and uniformity in 
the assessment of property is not practicable, 
a requirement of reasonable uniformity and 
equality is essential. . . . 
452 P.2d, at 879. 
Any valuation methodology or principle applied to determine 
the fair market value of property which produced unequal and 
disparate treatment contravenes both the Utah Constitution and the 
statutes of the State of Utah. 
In the instant case, the Commission, relying on its earlier 
decisions, adopted the position that an "absorption discount" be 
given to the property owner by reason of the fact that the taxpayer 
owns multiple parcels of property within the contested subdivision. 
The expert witnesses who testified for both sides at the 
formal hearing were in basic agreement about the "retail value" of 
the property. This "retail value" is synonymous with "fair market 
value", as determined by a comparable sales method. The evidence 
presented at the formal hearing clearly established that the unsold 
lots, all of which are owned by Benchmark, have value, as individu-
al lots, equal to the value of lots sold to individual purchasers 
within the Benchmark Subdivision. In resolving the controversy in 
favor of Benchmark, the Commission disregarded this fact and 
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determined that, because fl[t]he value of a lot sold today at a 
given price is greater than the value of a lot sold years into the 
future for the same price", Benchmark, as the owner of multiple 
lots, was entitled to a "bulk discount". 
Despite the Commission's Final Decision and Order, the fact 
remains that individual taxpayers who have purchased lots in the 
Benchmark Subdivision have their property assessed, for tax 
purposes, at the "retail value". If the Commission's decision is 
affirmed, the end result would be that the lots would be valued not 
on the basis of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in 
a hypothetical sale, but on the basis of who owns the property and 
how many lots are owned. 
To implement the Commission's ruling, the county taxing 
authorities would be required to ascertain whether each taxpayer 
owns one parcel of property, a few, or many and whether the tax-
payer anticipates a future sale of some or all of his property, 
which would entitle him to receive the benefit of an absorption 
discount on the assessed value of the property. To uniformly apply 
the principle adopted by the Commission in this case, county taxing 
authorities would be required to ascertain, as of the assessment 
date, which parcels of property were listed for sale, the asking 
price, a reasonable marketing period (based upon the level of 
income required to buy the property; the more expensive properties 
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requiring a longer marketing period), a reasonable profit to the 
seller, and an appropriate discount to be applied to each property 
listed for sale. 
Few courts have addressed this issue. However, recent 
decisions favor disallowance of the absorption discount. The court 
in Supervisor of Assessments v. St. Leonard Shores Joint Venture, 
486 A. 2d 206, 61 Md.App. 204 (1985), decided an identical issue. 
A real estate developer challenged the tax assessment, arguing that 
a "bulk ownership" discount should be applied. The court stated: 
The issue we must decide herein is wheth-
er bulk ownership of a subdivided tract of 
land should be considered by a tax assessor 
when assessing multiple lots owned by a single 
taxpayer. Appellant, the Supervisor of As-
sessments of Calvert County, did not consider 
the bulk ownership in accordance with a direc-
tive from the State Department of Assessments 
and Taxation ("SDAT"). We believe that the 
SDAT directive was properly issued and thus 
find bulk ownership is not a proper consider-
ation in the assessment process. 
* * * 
In light of this directive, the assess-
ment was affirmed by the Property Tax assess-
ment Appeal Board for Calvert County. Appel-
lee-developer next appealed to the Maryland 
Tax Court, which also affirmed the assessment 
finding that it represented the full cash 
value of the property, as required by statute. 
In a written order and recommendation, the 
Hearing Examiner of the Tax Court opined: 
"Petitioner's [appellee's] approach 
to fair market value is a staged sell-out 
over a period of years, . . . finally 
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reducing the end result to a net profit 
figure. This is good, sound business 
practice. Unfortunately, it is not the 
way the assessment process works. 
To implement Petitioner's approach 
to value would be to put the assessor in 
the position of being a joint venturer 
with the petitioner. If all the lots 
sold in one year, we have a value cer-
tain; if all lots sell over a period of 
years, we have a value dependent upon the 
future whims of the market place. (em-
phasis [sic] added.) 
The procedure is clear: recording all 
117 lots, prior to the date of finality, gave 
them all a fair market value as of the date of 
finality. That fair market value was estab-
lished by the Property Tax Assessment Appeal 
Board as the retail sales price of each lot. 
added each to the other, for a total of 
$2,635,000. 
I agree with this means of achieving a 
realistic market value of a hypothetical sale 
as of a hypothetical date. Accordingly, I 
recommend that the decision of the Property 
Tax Assessment Board be affirmed. 
486 A.2d, at 207-208. (Emphasis in original.) 
The court then discussed its reasons for not accepting the 
bulk ownership, staged sell-out, or absorption method: 
Finally, the State argues that in order 
to achieve truly uniform assessments, the fact 
that one person owns more than one lot should 
not be considered. We agree. Such consider-
ation would produce an inherent preference in 
favor of developers, as opposed to taxpayers 
who own single or scattered lots. The SDAT 
directive provides for equal treatment of all 
taxpayers, absent any consideration of their 
total land holdings. Moreover, a particularly 
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troublesome aspect of the "sell-out" period 
theory is the fuzzy line of demarcation be-
tween a developer and a person owning multiple 
lots. Specifically, exactly where should the 
line be drawn? Is the taxpayer who owns four 
lots or ten lots treated differently than a 
developer with twenty (plus) lots? Such 
differential treatment is facially unfair and 
possibly unconstitutional. Additionally, as 
correctly noted by the Hearing Examiner, 
utilization of the "sell-out" period theory 
essentially places the State in the position 
of "joint-venturer" with the developer. The 
value would rely "upon the future whims of the 
market place." 
486 A.2d, at 211-212. 
Affirming the decision of the Special Court of Appeals, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals, St. Leonard Shores Joint Ven. v. 
Supervisor, 514 A.2d 1215 (Md. 1986), noted: 
In disputing the Supervisor's assessment 
of the 105 unsold lots, appellant emphasizes 
that "[t]he problem . . . is that you didn't 
have 105 buyers, you had twelve—seven the 
first year and five the next year." Appel-
lant's argument misses the point. Regardless 
of whether a buyer for each lot actually 
exists, the assessor is required to assess 
each lot as if a willing buyer exists. This 
is not to say that a glut on the market should 
not be considered. We think, however, that 
the condition of the real estate market is 
adequately reflected in the price that the 
hypothetical buyer would be willing to pay. 
Therefore, we reject appellant's contention 
relating to the "sell-out period" of the lots. 
514 A.2d, at 1217. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the use of the absorption method relieves the 
developer of a portion of the tax burden that should be borne by 
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the developer and it imposes additional tax burdens on other 
taxpayers. It is respectfully submitted that this different 
treatment is "facially unfair", unconstitutional, and contrary to 
the clear mandate of the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes. 
In Charles J. and Charlott Mathias v. Department of Revenue, 
State of Oregon. Oregon Tax Court, Case No. 2910 (Decision filed 
April 10, 1990) (see Appendix 1), the Oregon Tax Court was called 
upon to determine whether a statute which provided that: "If the 
property consists of four or more lots within one subdivision, and 
the lots are held under one ownership, the lots shall be valued 
under a method which recognizes the time period over which those 
lots must be sold in order to realize current market prices for 
those lots." 1989 Or. Laws, Chapter 796, Section 30. 
The plaintiffs contended that the law was unconstitutional 
because it implicitly acknowledged that current, true cash value 
was greater than the value of the owners7 collective interest in 
the lots. The court, in analyzing the impact of the statute on 
fair market value and the constitutional provisions of the Oregon 
Constitution which mandate uniformity, determined that the statute 
directly violated the basic protection afforded by the Oregon 
Constitution because owners of lots of equal true cash value would 
not pay taxes on equal values. The multiple owner, given the 
discount because of his ownership, would be paying taxes on a 
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lesser value, not because the properties were different or were 
used differently, but simply because the owners were different• 
Some owners owned more than four lots, some owners owned less than 
four lots, some owners owned four lots. In each case, each owner 
was treated differently by virtue of his ownership even though the 
value of the lots was the same. In striking the statutory scheme, 
the Oregon Tax Court made the following significant statement: 
It is difficult for this Court to imagine 
a more discriminatory scheme. 
It is difficult to conceive of a justifi-
able exemption law which should select single 
individuals or corporations, or single arti-
cles of property, and, taking them out of the 
class to which they belong, make them the 
subject of a capricious legislative favor. 
[Citing 1 Taxation Section 381-382 (3rd Edi-
tion, 1903).] 
In a footnote, the court observed: 
The absorption period for collection of 
properties is not solely a function of their 
location. The fact that the method favors 
multiple ownership in the same subdivision 
does not directly correlate with the time it 
might take to market a number of lots owned by 
one taxpayer. 
The court reasoned: 
The statute directs disparate taxation of 
properties which are not different. Their 
physical characteristics and uses may be 
virtually identical. 
The court also noted that the Department of Revenue for the 
State of Oregon, with its expertise in ad valorem taxation, should 
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have understood that such a method as attempted to be employed in 
Oregon, "runs contrary to the basic principles of property 
taxation", citing the following statement in support of its 
position: 
It is a well accepted rule of valuation 
that the individual personalities and opportu-
nities of particular owners must be ignored, 
[4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Chapter 12; 
State Highway Commission v. Arnold, et a h , 
340 P. 2d 1089 (Oregon 1959) and Joseph Hydro 
Associates, Ltd, v. Department of Revenue, 10 
OTR 277 (Oregon Tax Court 1986). 
The Oregon Supreme Court has rejected a absorption or 
"developer's" discount in First Interstate Bank v. Dept. of Rev.. 
760 P.2d 880 (Or. 1988). In that case, as here, the taxpay-
er/developer sought a reduction of the fair market value by a rate 
return based on expected profit, taking into consideration the 
estimated time necessary to sell the lots. Discussing this 
"developer's discount", the court observed: 
Reduction by this method results in a 
determination of the properties7 value to the 
current owner or their value as an investment. 
This is not the market value, which is the 
price that each property would receive on the 
open market. [Citation omitted.] While in 
certain circumstances the value to the owner 
might equal the market value, the value to the 
owner cannot be equated with market value. 
There is no dispute that the highest and 
best use of each lot is for the construction 
of a single-family residence. Only by valuing 
the property at its highest and best use can 
the true cash value of a property be deter-
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mined. [Citation omitted.] The developer's 
discount does not assess the value of the 
properties if put to their highest and best 
use, but reduces their value to arrive at the 
value of the properties considered as an 
investment. Investment is not the highest and 
best use of the properties. 
We agree with the Tax Court that the 
developer's discount is not a permissible 
method of valuation in the present case. . . . 
760 P.2d, at 883. 
As was correctly observed by the Oregon Court, and is true 
with the scheme of property taxation employed in the State of Utah, 
the number of ownership interests and how they are arranged is 
immaterial to a property tax system that addresses the value of 
land for property tax purposes. In its final conclusion, the court 
determined that the statute that classified taxpayers based upon 
multiple ownership of lots resulted in a violation of the uniformi-
ty provisions of the Oregon Constitution because it reduced the tax 
burden on those persons who owned multiple lots, even though the 
lots were substantially similar to those persons owning four or 
fewer lots. 
The reasoning of the Oregon Tax Court is equally applicable in 
this case. The discount requested by Benchmark is requested after 
the fair market value of the property has been determined by using 
the comparable sales method. Indeed, Benchmark's own exhibit shows 
that, in employing the comparable sales method, there is less than 
BTP3.018 16 
5% difference, plus or minus, between the appraisal made by the 
expert witness for Benchmark, and the County's expert witness. 
In Glen Point Associates v. Township of Teaneck, 10 N.J. Tax 
506 (Tax Court of N.J. 1989), the taxpayer appealed the value of 
his property as established by the assessor for the township of 
Teaneck. The property owner's expert, in addition to other 
challenges, employed an income approach that included an absorption 
period discount for an estimated rent-up period to a structurally 
completed office building, when there was another office building 
in the same municipality that was comparable in all important 
respects, but was valued without a discount because it was fully 
rented. The court, rejecting this discount for a holding or rent-
up period (similar to a sell-out period), made the following 
observations: 
. . . The court concludes, therefore, that the 
expert's absorption-period discount is con-
trary to the New Jersey Constitution, Art. 
VIII, § 1, par. 1(a), which requires that all 
property be assessed in accordance with uni-
form rules and the same standard value. The 
absorption-period discount for an office 
building is conceptually indistinguishable 
from the marketing discount rejected by this 
court on identical constitutional ground in 
Glen Point Associates v. Teaneck Tp., 10 N.J. 
Tax 288 (Tax Ct. 1988) (sale of townhouse 
condominium units) and Tall Timbers, Inc. v. 
Vernon Tp. . 5 N.J. Tax 299 (Tax Ct. 1983) 
(sale of campsite condominium units). 
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The technique is unsound. The property 
is to be valued as though sold on the assess-
ing date, not according to its value on a 
subsequent date, discounted for time. [Cita-
tion omitted.] A purchaser is deemed to have 
made his decision as to the price he is will-
ing to pay, and the seller is deemed to have 
made his decision on the price he is willing 
to accept, on the basis of facts and circum-
stances known or reasonably foreseeable on the 
assessing date. [Citations omitted.] 
10 N.J. Tax, at 517. 
The absorption rate discount granted to Benchmark, and 
seemingly established for all taxpayers owning multiple parcels of 
property held for sale, is inconsistent with the Utah Constitution 
and statutes which require property to be valued for assessment 
purposes at its full cash value, as of the date of assessment. 
Application of the discount relies on the character of ownership as 
opposed to the character of the property. Neither the Constitution 
nor the statutes of this State contemplate that the land holdings 
of a taxpayer will affect the value of his properties for assess-
ment purposes. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ADOPTING APPRAISAL METHODS 
USED BY INSTITUTIONAL LENDERS IN VALUING 
REAL PROPERTY FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES 
In the context of equality and uniformity, an absorption 
discount might be supportable when dealing with valuation of 
proposed subdivision which are not complete or in a case where no 
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lots have been sold. However, the application of an absorption or 
bulk discount to the subject property, where numerous parcels 
within the subdivision have been sold and appraised by the County 
for tax purposes at the fair market value, based on the comparable 
sales method, constitutes a violation of the principles of 
uniformity. 
It is evident from Exhibit 8 (R. 74-78) that the value which 
Benchmark places on its property requires the developer's lots 
receive a substantial discount in their taxable value from the 
value established by the County on lots within the same subdivision 
which have been sold to individual lot owners. The Commission 
adopted this discount, despite the fact that Benchmark's own expert 
witness and the County's expert witness agreed the lots were 
comparable in all respects and carried the same "retail value". 
This asserted difference in value is not the result of any 
difference in what a willing buyer would pay for each lot to a 
willing seller in a hypothetical sale as of the assessment date. 
The difference is the result of utilizing totally different 
methodologies to value the comparable properties, based upon the 
ownership of the properties. 
In arriving at its decision, the Commission gave great weight 
to federal regulations governing the appraisal of properties in the 
context of obtaining financing. Benchmark's expert relied upon and 
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testified extensively concerning a memorandum, R 41c (R. 51), 
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of Examinations 
and Supervision. The memorandum deals with appraisal policies and 
practices of insured institutions and service corporations and 
establishes guidelines for appraisals of properties in the context 
of applying for and obtaining financing and seeks to implement 
standards to ensure that appraisals "properly reflect the collater-
al lending posture of the institution, as well as its lending 
policies." (R. 52, lines 19-21.) The memorandum is designed to 
ensure that appraisals of property will be prepared so as to 
reflect the present value estimates of the property over the life 
of the credit arrangement. 
Lenders are concerned with recovering their carrying costs, 
providing reserves for repossession costs, and considering resale 
costs. In view of recent failures of financial institutions, it is 
not surprising that more conservative policies have been adopted to 
prevent excessive loans being made on properties which will not be 
sold, in bulk, but rather liquidated over a substantial period of 
time. It is common knowledge that lenders do not lend 100% of the 
fair market value of a property. Rather, they lend on a discounted 
value such as that adopted by the Commission. This loan value will 
theoretically provide the lender with protection of its collateral 
in the event the lender is required to repossess and resell the 
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property. 
It is clear, then, that the Commission adopted a valuation 
method based upon the amount a willing lender will lend to a 
willing borrower to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that 
the loan will be timely repaid. The documentary evidence and 
testimony presented by Benchmark at the formal hearing concerning 
the use of entrepreneurial profit, carrying costs, and other 
factors to be considered in arriving at an absorption discount 
would be relevant only if the Commission were sitting to determine 
if the County had properly valued the property for purposes of 
obtaining a loan from a federally insured institution. Imposing 
these governmental regulations on county taxing authorities totally 
disregards the concept of fair market value; the concept of a 
willing buyer and a willing seller. Utilization of two completely 
different valuation methods to assess identical properties for tax 
purposes is manifestly unjust and results in a de facto amendment 
of the Utah statute defining fair market value. 
CONCLUSION 
The property which is the subject matter of this litigation is 
part of a platted subdivision in Salt Lake County. Benchmark seeks 
a tax advantage, via an absorption discount, over taxpayers owning 
identical properties. The only difference between the properties 
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owned by Benchmark and other lot owners within the Benchmark 
Subdivision is that Benchmark owns multiple lots. Neither the Utah 
Constitution, Utah statutes, nor any prior decisions of this court 
contemplate that the number of parcels owned by a particular 
taxpayer should be considered in determining the fair market value 
of each parcel for tax assessment purposes. 
The Commission erred in considering the regulations and 
policies of federally insured lending institutions dispositive of 
the appropriate valuation method. The result of the Commission's 
decision is a unequal and unfair benefit in favor of developers and 
the imposition of an unfair share of the tax burden upon individual 
lot owners. This result is prohibited by the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. For these reasons, the decision of the Commission 
should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / fo — day of October, 1991. 
DAVID YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Deputy County Attf 
— ^ I L L THdMA'S PETERS 
BTP3.018 22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, this 
day of October, 1991, to the following: 
Benchmark, Inc. 
Rodney M. Pipella, Esq. 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Robert A. Peterson, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
R. Paul Van Dam, Esq. 
Attorney General of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IM. 
BTP3.018 23 
APPENDIX 1 
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT 
Property Tax 
No. 2910 
CHARLES J. and CHARLOTTE ) 
MATHIAS, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) 
State of Oregon, ) 
Defendant. ) 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs own a lot in a subdivision in 
West Salem. Comparable lots in the same subdivision are 
assessed at values lower than plaintiffs' because of their 
ownership. Defendant has approved this unequal treatment 
because the 1989 legislature enacted ORS 308.205(3). That 
statute provides: 
"If the property consists of four or more lots 
within one subdivision, and the lots are held under 
one ownership, the lots shall be valued under a 
method which recognizes the time period over which 
those lots must be sold in order to realize current 
market prices for those lots.11 1989 Or Laws 
ch 796, § 30. 
Plaintiffs contend that this law is 
unconstitutional. Inasmuch as there is no dispute as to the 
RLE.0 
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facts, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.1 
BACKGROUND 
The "dominate note" of Oregon's property tax system 
is that property is to be valued at its market value. 
Portland Canning Co. v. Tax Com.. 241 Or 109, 404 P2d 236 
(1965). Before 1987, defendant mistakenly advised the county 
assessors to apply a "developer's discount" to lots which 
collectively would take more than one year to sell. This 
resulted in developer-owned lots being assessed at less than 
true cash value while individually owned lots were assessed 
at full true cash value. 
In First Interstate Bank v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR 
452 (1987), afffd 306 Or 450, 760 P2d 880 (1988), this court 
condemned that practice because it values the owner's 
interest in the property. Property tax is imposed on the 
value of the property, not the value of the owner's interest. 
Soroul et al v^ Gilbert et a_l, 226 Or 392, 421, 359 P2d 543 
(1961). This court found there is no basis for valuing a 
$14,000 lot at $9,000 simply because the owner owns many 
such lots. If such a valuation principle were accepted, the 
1
 1989 Or Laws ch 796, § 32 provides: 
"The Department of Revenue and the Oregon Tax 
Court shall apply the amendments to ORS 308.205 by 
section 30 of this Act in any appeal pending on 
March 31, 1989." 
Plaintiffs1 appeal, commenced in 1988, was pending before the 
Department of Revenue on March 31, 1989. 
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largest timber owners, landlords and industries could 
likewise lay claim to a discount. The court also found that 
the developer's discount method violated Oregon^ 
constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation.2 
After the Supreme Court's decision, a bill was 
introduced in the 1989 legislature to make the method law. 
With only minor changes, and with the support of the 
Department of Revenue, the provision was enacted as 
1989 Or Laws ch 796, § 30. 
LAW PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL 
Once again this court must consider the validity of 
the "developer's discount" method. However, in this instance 
it is "presumed to be constitutional and every intendment 
must be indulged by the court in favor of its validity." 
Tompkins v. District Boundary Board. 180 Or 339, 350, 
177 P2d 416 (1947). Further, if plaintiffs are to prevail 
they must show that the statute is unconstitutional "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
"It is also a canon of statutory construction 
that if a legislative enactment can be given any 
reasonable construction consistent with its 
validity, such interpretation should be adopted." 
Wright v. Blue Mt. Hospital Dist.f 214 Or 141, 
144, 328 P2d 314 (1958). 
Finally: 
"After the process of construction has been 
accomplished, the decisions still admonish that we 
should indulge every presumption in favor of 
2
 The constitutional issue was not reached by the 
Supreme Court in affirming this court's decision. 
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validity and declare no act of the legislature void 
unless invalidity be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v^ . Anthony, 179 Or 282, 301, 169 P2d 
587 (1946). 
gee also City of Portland v^ Goodwin, 187 Or 409, 416, 210 
P2d 577 (1949). 
Two provisions of Oregon*s constitution directly 
bear on the issue. The relevant portion of Article I, 
section 32, requires that: 
11
 [A] 11 taxation shall be uniform on the same class 
of subjects within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax." 
In a similar vein, Article IX, section 1, provides: 
"The Legislative Assembly shall, and the 
people through the initiative may, provide by law 
uniform rules of assessment and taxation. All 
taxes shall be levied and collected under general 
laws operating uniformly throughout the State.11 
In commenting upon the effect of these two 
provisions, the Oregon Supreme Court has stated: 
"These provisions were intended to permit the 
reasonable classification of subjects of taxation 
* * *. The legislature has wide discretion in 
classifying subjects of taxation." Knight v. Dept. 
of Revenue. 293 Or 267, 271, 646 P2d 1343 (1982). 
CONSTRUING THE STATUTE 
The apparent purpose of the statute is to benefit 
those taxpayers who own more than four lots in one 
subdivision by treating the lots as a collective whole. By 
assuming that sale of the lots will take place over time, the 
greater the number of lots held under one ownership, the 
greater the discount. While this may seem patently unfair to 
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taxpayers who own fewer than four lots, the classification 
roust be sustained if there is any rational basis for it. 
"What is required in assessing a constitutional 
challenge to classification for tax benefit is a 
review of the grounds for the classification to 
determine if it rests upon a rational basis. The 
legislature may make distinctions of degree having 
a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial 
scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that 
basis if there is any conceivable state of facts 
which would support it. Carmichael v. Southern 
Coal Co,, 301 US 495, 57 S Ct 868, 81 L Ed 1245, 
109 ALR 1327 (1937) ; Smith et al v^ Columbia County 
et ai, 216 Or 662, 341 P2d 540 (1959). It, 
however, is not sufficient to merely point out 
differences between the groups of taxpayers for 
divergent treatment• The differences justifying 
the attempted classification must bear a reasonable 
relationship to the legislative purpose. The 
legislative power to create a classification 
implies the authority to subclassify persons 
included in the general class if there is a 
rational basis for making this further distinction. 
Smith et al v^ Columbia County et al, supra; State 
v^ Kozer, 116 Or 581, 242 P 621 (1926).If Huckaba 
v. Johnson, 281 Or 23, 26, 573 P2d 305 (1978). 
In examining the statute, it is difficult to find 
any rational basis for the distinctions. The "lots" involved 
are not limited to newly developed or even vacant lots. They 
are also not restricted in use or size. A national 
corporation could own ten lots of one acre each in an 
industrial subdivision improved with a large manufacturing 
plant. The corporation would be entitled to a reduced value 
for those lots. Despite the apparent purpose of the law, 
ownership is not limited to developers, financial 
institutions or any other particular type of owner. 
By discounting the value of the lots over time, 
the statute assumes that the lots are for sale. Strangely, 
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it does not require the lots to be held for sale. Also, 
"current market prices" can only mean the current market 
value or true cash value. Thus, the statute implicitly 
acknowledges that current true cash value is greater than the 
value of the owner's collective interest in those lots. In 
essence, the statute is directing valuation based on 
ownership interests rather than the property's actual value. 
This presents significant uniformity problems. Two examples 
will illustrate those problems. 
Example 1 
Assume a subdivision of 300 lots, all of which are 
very similar and have the same "current market price." A 
taxpayer who owns 150 lots in the subdivision will be 
assessed less value per lot than a taxpayer owning 15 lots. 
Likewise, a taxpayer owning 15 lots will be assessed at a 
lesser value per lot than a taxpayer owning five lots. Only 
those taxpayers owning less than four lots will receive no 
reduction from true cash value. 
Example 2 
A taxpayer might be a landlord who owns 20 rental 
houses in the same subdivision. The 20 lots would be reduced 
in value as if they were for sale even though they are not. 
Another landlord may own 20 similar rental houses located in 
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several subdivisions* That landlord will receive no reduced 
land value even though all 20 properties are for sale*3 
m RATIONAL BASIS 
This court cannot find any rational basis for the 
distinctions made. Defendant contends that the statute was 
perhaps enacted to encourage subdivision development* 
However, the statute is not limited to developers nor to 
property being developed. The statute does not encourage 
development. It only encourages multiple lot ownership in 
the same subdivision. 
The court finds that the statute directly violates 
the basic protection afforded by Article I, section 32 of the 
Oregon Constitution. Property of the same class, i.e., lots 
in subdivisions, are not subject to uniform taxation. Owners 
of lots of equal true cash value would not pay taxes on equal 
values. This is not because the properties are different or 
are used differently but simply because the owners are 
different. It is difficult for this court to imagine a more 
discriminatory scheme. 
"It is difficult to conceive of a justifiable 
exemption law which should select single 
individuals or corporations, or single articles of 
property, and, taking them out of the class to 
which they belong, make them the subject of 
capricious legislative favor." 1 Cooley, Taxation 
381-382 (3rd ed 1903). 
3
 The absorption period for a collection of properties 
is not solely a function of their location. The fact that 
the method favors multiple ownership in the same subdivision 
does not directly correlate with the time it might take to 
market a number of lots owned by one taxpayer. 
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The statute directs disparate taxation of 
properties which are not different. Their physical 
characteristics and uses may be virtually identical, in 
fact, even the owners may be identical. A taxpayer may own 
four lots in one subdivision, the values of which are 
reduced, and three lots in another subdivision, the values of 
which are not reduced. The statute fails to describe the 
class for special treatment by any characteristics having a 
rational basis for the difference. There can be little doubt 
that if the statute attempted to impose a higher value for 
taxation, the classification would be declared 
unconstitutional. 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AD VALOREM TAXATION 
It is difficult for this court to understand how 
the department could encourage the legislarure to enact such 
a provision. Surely the department, with its expertise in 
ad valorem taxation, should understand that such a method 
runs contrary to the basic principles of property taxation. 
"It is a well-accepted rule of valuation that the 
individual personalities and opportunities of 
particular owners must be ignored. 4 Nichols on 
Emminent Domain ch 12; State Highway Com, v. 
Arnold et al, 218 Or 43, 341 P2d 1089, 343 P2d 1113 
(1959).,f Joseph Hydro Associates, Ltd. v. Dept. of 
Rev^ , 10 OTR 27 7, 283 (1986) towner's income tax 
consequences on hypothetical sale of property 
ignored] . 
The number of ownership interests and how they are 
arranged are ignored in our property tax system. 
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"In fixing the true cash value of land for 
property tax purposes the effect of existing leases 
on the value to the owner is disregarded. The 
basis for such a principle is that the tax is 
levied upon the land and is a tax upon all the 
interests into which the land might be divided." 
Swan Lake flldq. Co^ v^ Dept. of Rev.. 257 Or 622, 
625, 478 P2d 393, 480 P2d 713 (1971). 
Only where partial interests become part of the 
public domain by easement, restrictions or other conveyance 
are such interests recognized. See for example Willamette 
factors v^ Pept, of Rev.. 8 OTR 400 (1980); Rockwood 
pevelopment Corp, v^ Pept. of Rev,
 r 10 OTR 95 (1985) ; 
Tualatin Pevelopment v. Dept. of Rev,. 256 Or 323, 473 P2d 
660 (1970), and Marchel v. Dept, of Rev,. 9 OTR 317 (1983)• 
The statute tries to account for the time the 
property may have to be on the market before it sells. 
However, defendant's own administrative rule defining "Market 
Value" recognizes that every property requires some time to 
be exposed on the market, 
"Market Value as a basis for true cash value 
shall be taken to mean the most probable price in 
terms of money which a property will bring if 
exposed for sale in the open market, allowing a 
period of time and financing typical for the 
particular type of property involved and under 
conditions where both parties to the transaction 
are under no undue compulsion to sell or buy and 
are able, willing and reasonably well-informed. •• 
OAR 150-308.205(A)(1) (a) . (Emphasis added.) 
As pointed out above, the legislature has wide 
discretion in making classifications. It may tax property 
unequally just as it may exempt some property entirely. In 
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doing so, however, there must be some rational basis for the 
classifications it makes. 
"This does not mean that the subjects of the 
class selected for taxation shal*1 be precisely 
alike in all respects, but rather that they mast be 
alike in the essential particulars which induced 
the legislature to include them in one 
classification. All within the class must be 
susceptible of like treatment and all the 
com :ituents of the class must be affected alike 
under like circumstances.11 Standard Lbr, Co. v. 
Pierce et al^, 112 Or 314, 336, 228 P 812 (1924). 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the legislature has selected for 
classification taxpayers owning more than four lots in one 
subdivision. The court is unable to discern any essential 
similarities in the subjects of the classification made. It 
discriminates against those owning fewer than four lots in 
one subdivision by reducing the tax burden of those who own 
more than four lots. If the uniformity provisions mean 
anything, they must prohibit this type of discrimination. 
Now, therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment be, and hereby is, denied; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, granted. 
Plaintiffs to recover their costs and 
disbursements. 
Dated this /Q& day of April 1990. 
JUDGE 
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